AAIU Reports

SYNOPSIS

While the scheduled passenger flight was in the cruise at Flight Level (FL) 380, the Flight Crew received an initial clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to descend to FL340. However, FL240 was set in the altitude window. During the descent ATC was queried regarding the cleared level and confirmation was obtained that FL340 was the cleared level as the aircraft was approaching FL340. The autopilot was disconnected and a manual control input was made to quickly level the aircraft. As a result of the rapid pitch change, a Cabin Crew Member (CCM), who was stationed in the aft galley area of the aircraft, sustained a broken ankle.

One Safety Recommendation is made to the Operator as a result of this Investigation.

SYNOPSIS

While descending towards Riga, in poor weather conditions with moderate snow, the indicated airspeed (IAS) readings began to diverge. The Flight Crew decided, following evaluation, that the IAS displayed on the First Officer’s (F/O) side was incorrect. Airspeed disagreement and other warnings then activated. Following completion of checklists an ILS approach to Runway (RWY) 18 was commenced with Air Traffic Control (ATC) actively monitoring the aircraft. During the approach both the autopilot and autothrottle disconnected and the approach was continued hand flown. During the later stages of the approach the stall warning (stick shaker) activated on the F/O’s side and this continued until after the landing.

Subsequent maintenance action found that, although the pitot heater on the F/O’s side had failed due to a short circuit, the pitot heater failure warning had not activated because the design of the warning system may not detect failures of this nature.

As a result of the Investigation, two Safety Recommendations are issued to the aircraft’s Manufacturer regarding the design of the pitot heater failure warning system and the guidance provided to flight crew. A further Safety Recommendations is issued to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the B737-800.

SYNOPSIS

EI-REH made an approach to Runway (RWY) 17 at EICK in gusting crosswinds and turbulent conditions. During the landing, initial contact with the runway surface was on the main landing gear wheels with a nose up pitch attitude. The aircraft bounced slightly and simultaneously pitched down sharply. The second contact with the runway was solely on the nose wheels. The Commander immediately initiated a go-around and thereafter a normal approach and landing was made on RWY 17. Subsequently, the nose landing gear was withdrawn from service since the certification basis and design criteria did not foresee such an occurrence.

SYNOPSIS

The flight crew of G-VIIK experienced a series of smoke events on the flightdeck while in the cruise over mid-Atlantic. They declared an emergency and the First Officer (F/O) donned his oxygen mask. They descended the aircraft to Flight Level (FL) 150 and diverted to Shannon Airport (EINN), Ireland. The cause of the smoke was later identified as a bearing failure of the primary equipment cooling supply fan.                                                                                                  

SYNOPSIS

During cruise the First Officer (F/O) began to feel unwell. His condition deteriorated progressively while the aircraft was over the North Atlantic Ocean. The Commander was advised by a doctor on board that the F/O should be brought to hospital and a decision was taken to divert to Dublin. An experienced captain with a different airline, who was travelling as a passenger, was identified by the cabin crew and assisted the Commander with cockpit duties for descent, approach and landing. Following an uneventful landing the F/O was taken to hospital by ambulance.